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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EIGHTY-SIX THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL APPLIES TO PREINDICTMENT PLEA NEGOTIATIONS TOOTURNER V. UNITED STATES, 885 F.3D 949
(6TH CIR. 2018) (EN BANC).
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees certain
protections to defendants during critical stages of criminal proceedings. 1
These protections, however, do not extend to the defendant until the
prosecution has commenced. 2 In Turner v. UnitedStates, 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered whether
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to pre-indictment plea
negotiations. 4 The court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
extends to a criminal defendant only once judicial proceedings have
commenced, and thus, does not encompass pre-indictment plea
negotiations.'

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (assigning inalienable rights in criminal proceedings).
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].
Id.

2

See Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (articulating

circumstances under which Sixth Amendment protections attach).
3 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
4 See id. at 952 (asserting one of two issues addressed in case). Unaddressed in this case
comment, the court also decided "whether an indictment in a state prosecution triggers a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel" with respect to "forthcoming federal charges based
on the same underlying conduct." Id. The court held that the state charge does not trigger the right
to counsel in the impending federal charge because the right to counsel is "offense specific" and
"cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 954 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)).
5 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 951 (announcing holding of case).
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In 2007, John Turner robbed four Tennessee businesses at gunpoint.6
He was arrested for these crimes by a Memphis police officer who also
served as a member of a joint federal-state task force.'

With respect to the

state charges, Turner was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated robbery,
and he hired an attorney to represent him on these charges, which included

representation during the plea negotiations with the state prosecutors. s
During the state proceedings, it became clear that the United States
Attorney's Office planned to bring federal charges, including those related

to robbery and firearm possession, against Turner as part of the federal-state
task force.9 The Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") offered
Turner's attorney a plea of fifteen years.'° The AUSA stipulated, however,
that the offer "would expire if and when a federal grand jury indicted
Turner."1 1 It is disputed, but not of consequence to the issue at hand, whether
Turner refused the plea deal once it was offered or if he was even presented
with the deal at all.' 2 The grand jury in the Western District of Tennessee

6 See id (outlining underlying crimes Turner committed); see also Brief for the United States

in Opposition at *5-6, Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) (No. 18-106), 2018
Lexis 4602 (businesses included dry cleaner, beauty shop, pizza parlor, and convenience store).
7 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 951 (iterating basis for federal and state cases); Turner v. United
States, 848 F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), affd en banc, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) (describing
task force). The Safe Streets Task Force (SSTF) was "a joint federal-state task force created to
target and prosecute individuals involved in serious crimes." Turner, 848 F.3d at 768 n. 1. The task
force was the result of a Memorandum of Understanding between the FBI and various Tennessee
city and county police departments. Id. The memorandum articulated that "the criteria for
determining whether to prosecute a particular violation in state or federal court will focus upon
achieving the greatest overall benefit to law enforcement and the jurisdiction will be resolved
through discussion among all investigative agencies and prosecutive [sic] entities having an interest
in the matter." Id.
8 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 951 (describing procedural history); Turner, 848 F.3d at 768
(discussing Turner's retention of private attorney). This case is not concerned with Turner's right
to counsel as an indigent defendant as he could afford one and thus did not need the state to appoint
him an attorney. Turner, 848 F.3d at 768. while not at issue in the case-in-chief, Turner was
offered and then accepted a plea deal on the state charges that resulted in a sentence of eight or nine
years. Id.
9 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 951-52 (stating federal firearm charges alone carry mandatory
minimum of eighty-two years' imprisonment).
10 See id.at 952 (chronicling proceedings). The AUSA planned to bring federal charges under
the Hobbs Act, which criminalizes interference with commerce by threats or violence, and for using
a firearm during a crime of violence for each of the four robberies. Turner, 848 F.3d at 769.
" See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (setting scope of plea offer). The offer was extended at some
point during the summer of 2008 and was to expire around September 15, 2008 when the charges
were presented to the grand jury. Turner, 848 F.3d at 769. It is important to note that the low
standard for federal indictment practically cementing Turner's indictment. FED. R. CRIM.P. 6.
12 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (highlighting sub-matter of case not at issue in case).
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indicted Turner in 2008."3 Turner subsequently hired a new attorney who
helped him negotiate a plea deal of twenty-five years imprisonment. 4
In 2012, Turner filed a "motion alleging that his original attorney
rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance during [his] federal plea
negotiations."15 The district court denied his motion, holding that Turner's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached during his preindictment federal plea negotiations; thus, he had no standing to bring a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.16 On appeal, the United States
17
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
Turner filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which the court granted.1 8 The
court reaffirmed the ruling and held that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of judicial criminal
proceedings.19 The right does not attach at any point before the initiation of
adversarial judicial criminal proceedings, and therefore the Sixth

13 See id. (describing federal indictment).
14 See id. (explaining how Turner waived his right to file direct appeal as part of plea
agreement). The ability to appeal is one of the differences between the original plea offer, which
Turner would have preferred, and the one he received as a result of the expiration of the first plea
offer. Id. Turner's sentence will also be followed by three years of supervised release. Brief for
the United States in Opposition, supranote 6, at *5. Turner was ultimately convicted on four counts
of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of carrying and using a firearm during or in relation to a crime
of violence. Id. at *4-5.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating basis for claim). The Sixth Amendment which states,
"in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence [sic]," was the basis for Turner's constitutional claim. Id.;
see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)
(2019) (declaring motion Turner filed); Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (stating motion was filed because
of ineffective assistance of counsel). The code states in pertinent part: "[a] prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court ...claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution.. . may move the court which imposed the sentence
to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). This type of appeal was not
forfeited in Turner's plea acceptance. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952.
16 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (finding no constitutional issue); Turner v. United States, No.
2:12-cv-02266-SHM-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190572, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2015)
(expressing basis for denying claim).
17 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (articulating procedural posture); Turner v. United States, 848
F.3d 767, 768 (6th Cir. 2017), aff'den banc, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming district court's
denial of evidentiary hearing). The same court decided both cases, one sitting en banc, the other
as a panel. Turner, 885 F.3d at 952; Turner, 848 F.3d at 767.
18 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (noting all sixteen circuit judges sat on panel).
19 See id. at 951 (refusing to overrule precedent). Judicial criminal proceedings commence by
way of "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Id.(quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). Turner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which
was recently denied by the Supreme Court. Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 2740 (2019).
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Amendment right to counsel does not extend to pre-indictment plea
negotiations.°
The Sixth Amendment, in the interest of protecting the most
vulnerable peoples in the criminal justice system, broadly declares that "the
accused" are entitled to "the21 Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]" in
"all criminal prosecutions.,
These cases often come up through the courts
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but there can be no
ineffective assistance of counsel if the right to counsel has yet to attach to
the proceedings.2 2 In applying that right to various scenarios likely
unimaginable by the Constitution's drafters, the Supreme Court has sought
to define key terms and form rules for when and in what instances the right
to counsel does and does not attach. 23 This right has been afforded to the
criminally accused going as far back as the eighteenth century.24
The Supreme Court's attachment rule is guided mostly by the "plain
language of the [Sixth] Amendment" and identifies the key phases in a
proceeding when the right to counsel attaches. 25 This is "only at or after the
20 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952-53 (highlighting that pre-indictment plea negotiations are not
critical stage deserving of Sixth Amendment protection).
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (declaring rights); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63
(1938) (emphasizing rights of life and liberty that Sixth Amendment protects); United States v.
Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 2000) (Wiseman, J., concurring) (aiming to "protect defendants
in critical stages of their prosecution"). "[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition
of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel." Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
22 See Smith v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2006) ("There can
be a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only at a stage of the proceedings when
there is a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment."). In the inverse, the court specified that
there can be no claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel where there is no right to
counsel. Id. at 433 n.4.
23 See Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel
Doctrine, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 1635, 1641 (2003) (articulating history and evolution of Sixth
Amendment).
24 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932) (discussing historical evolution of right);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (examining necessity of counsel in criminal
proceedings); Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providingfor a Right to Counsel in Civil
Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245-47 (2006) [https://perma.cc/P57W-28DU] (describing
states' gradual adoption and application of right to counsel). In the past, not all states permitted the
right to all criminal prosecutions, sometimes it was limited to only the more serious crimes, and,
further, sometimes only in capital cases. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73; Abel, supra note 24, at 245-47.
The right now applies in federal and state cases alike for all criminal charges, save some
misdemeanors, and even in some state civil matters, as well as family law and probate matters.
Abel, supra note 24, at 245-47.
25 See, e.g. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-89 (1984) ("right to counsel attaches
only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated"); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (necessitating scrutiny of every pretrial confrontation); Powell, 287
U.S. at 57 (articulating when and in what instances right to counsel attaches).
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time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against"
someone, which includes a "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment. '26 In Gouveia, however, the Court warned that
there may be some circumstances in which the right to counsel may attach
prior to the formal initiation of judicial proceedings. 27 In response, the right
to counsel has expanded from its initial limitation of only applying at trial to
applying in certain pretrial "trial-like confrontation[s] .28 This is because the
dangers that initially gave birth to the right to counsel were found equally
strong and deserving of protection in other critical stages such as postindictment interrogations, post-indictment lineups, and the entry of guilty
pleas.2 9 Courts have speculated as to whether this list is inclusive or
exhaustive.3" In deciding whether to include pretrial proceedings under the
Sixth Amendment's umbrella, case law recommends an examination of any
pretrial confrontation to determine whether the right to counsel is required
in order to preserve the defendant's rights.31

26 See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-89; Powell, 287 U.S. at 57 (providing specific examples of when

right attaches). The Court in Powell further noted that failure to provide counsel at trial was also a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 287 U.S. at 71. See United States
v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1181 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (suggesting plea bargaining is "judicial
proceeding"). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulate plea bargains, grants
judges ultimate supervision over plea bargains and it can be argued "that plea bargaining is itself a
judicial proceeding in the sense contemplated by Kirby." Id.
27 See Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("the right to counsel might under

some circumstances attach prior to the formal initiation of judicial proceedings").
28 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 338 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (holding Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to photographic identifications). "[I]n order to be
deemed 'critical,' the particular 'stage of the prosecution' under consideration must, at the very
least, involve the physical 'presence of the accused,' at a 'trial-like confrontation' with the
Government, at which the accused requires the 'guiding hand of counsel. "' Id.
29 See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 892 (3d Cir. 1999) (entertaining
idea of expanding attachment issue in Third Circuit). "The right also may attach at earlier stages,
when 'the accused is confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system ...in a situation where
the results of the confrontation might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a
mere formality."' Id.(quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189). See Wade v. State, No. E2017-02177CCA-R3-PC, 2018 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 690, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2018)
(recognizing plea-bargaining process as critical stage in Tennessee). "[A] precise definition for
what constitutes a critical stage does not exist in Tennessee," which shows flexibility and
uncertainty in the rule. Id.
30 See Kennedy v. United States, 756 F.3d 492, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2014) (postulating that both
pre- and post-indictment plea negotiations deserve Sixth Amendment protection). "Had the
Supreme Court erased the line between preindictment and postindictment proceedings for plea
negotiations, it surely would have said so given its careful attention to the distinction for
interrogations and lineups." Id.at 494.
31 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 262 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (suggesting
defendants have Sixth Amendment protection at post-indictment lineups); but see Dr. John Olsson,
Who Amended the Amendment?, 5 AKRON J. CONSTITUTIONAL L. & POL'Y 15, 22 (2014)

(suggesting Kirby overruled Wade); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 208 (2008)
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Recently, the Supreme Court again extended the Sixth Amendment
32
to encompass another critical stage of the prosecution: plea negotiations.
But, in Kirby v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment

did not extend to pre-indictment identification even though the same post33
indictment lineup is treated as a critical stage requiring such protections.
The Sixth Circuit follows the bright-line rule defined in Kirby and holds that

the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the "initiation of
judicial criminal proceedings" and so the pre-indictment plea offer is not

(describing how Sixth Amendment attachment is determined); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
313 (1973) (noting Court called for "examination" of event to determine defendant had Sixth
Amendment protection); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-91 (1972) (determining right to
counsel was result of careful evaluation of facts and circumstances). When determining whether
there has been attachment, the critical question is "whether the machinery of prosecution was turned
on," and not by whom. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 208. Rothgery implied that a prosecutorial action,
such as filing information with the court, while not a critical stage, may still constitute attachment
of the right to counsel. Id. at 212. See David C. Dearborn, "You Have the Right to an Attorney, "
but Not Right Now: CombatingMiranda 's Failureby Advancing the Point of Attachment Under
Article MI of the MassachusettsDeclarationof Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 359, 363 (2011)
(suggesting Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches moment Mirandawarnings are required).
32 See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (requiring right to counsel during plea
negotiations to criminal defendants); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (designating plea
negotiations as critical stages deserving right to counsel). In these cases, though, the defendants
were already indicted when they were offered their plea deal. Frye, 566 U.S. at 138; Lafler, 566
U.S. at 156. The Court in Frye highlighted that a significant amount of convictions end as a result
of a plea entry which makes them a central part of the criminal justice system. 566 U.S. at 143.
For many defendants, this makes the negotiation of a plea, and not the trial, the critical stage of the
prosecution. Id. at 144. For those who accept a plea offer, the negotiation and acceptance of that
plea is the only time at which assistance of counsel can be beneficial to them. Id. Additionally,
post-indictment plea negotiations are protected by the right to counsel even if the negotiations have
no effect on the fairness of the conviction. Kennedy v. United States, 756 F.3d 492, 493 (6th Cir.
2014) (stipulating neither Lafler nor Frye answered whether right to counsel attached in preindictment plea negotiations).
33 See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690-91 (limiting scope of Sixth Amendment). When a suspect has
yet to be "formally charged with a criminal offense,.... the appropriate constitutional balance" is
struck when "the right of a suspect to be protected from prejudicial procedures" is balanced against
"the interest of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime." Id. at
691. But see United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 1980) (Wiseman, J., dissenting)
("right to counsel should begin with the commencement of plea bargaining in those rather unusual
cases where plea bargaining precedes formal charges").
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deserving of constitutional protection.3 4 Many courts at all levels have
hinted and urged for an expansion of the right to counsel.3 5
In Turner v. United States, the Sixth Circuit applied the precedent
and upheld the Supreme Court's established bright-line rule that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to pre-indictment plea
negotiations.3 6 The court reasoned that while plea negotiations are critical

31 See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2000) (following precedent,
begrudgingly). The court writes extensively on its desire to stray from the precedent and urges the
Supreme Court to revise the bright-line rule. Id. The court suggests that when a formal plea has
been offered for a specific offense and a specific sentence, the "adverse positions of the government
and suspect have solidified." Id. "[lIt seems a triumph of the letter over the spirit of the law to
hold that [the accused] had no right to counsel in his decision to accept or deny the offered plea
bargain only because the government had not yet filed formal charges." Id. at 616.
" See United States v. Giamo, 665 F. App'x 154, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2016) (hinting right to
counsel extends to pre-indictment negotiation of plea). While this case was ultimately decided
under another question, the court held that the defendant could not prove he would have accepted
the plea agreement as offered and overlooked the question of whether defendant's attorney's
assistance at this stage, a pre-indictment plea negotiation, was required by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 157; see Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that right to
counsel may attach before government files charges); Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1290-91
(1st Cir. 1995) (determining when right to counsel attaches); United States v. Larkin, 978 F.2d 964,
969 (7th Cir. 1992) (suggesting right attaches prior to formal commencement if government's focus
switched from investigatory to accusatory). "By its very terms, [the Amendment] becomes
applicable only when the government's role shifts from investigation to accusation. For it is only
then that the assistance of one versed in the 'intricacies ... of law,' is needed ..
" Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
See Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448, 453 (Cir. Ct., D. Penn 1806) (holding Sixth Amendment rights
applied even though accused had not yet been formally charged); United States v. Moore, 26 F.
Cas. 1308, 1309 (D. Pa. 1801) ("[A] 'public prosecution,' . . . is instituted and commenced when
the party, by process, or otherways, is brought before a court or magistrate, and on information or
proof is held to answer. The subsequent indictment is but a continuation of the prosecution so
begun."); Allen v. State, 10 Ga. 85, 90-91 (1851) (highlighting when rights attach to defendants'
pre-indictment); Alexis Berglund, Comment: Turner-ing over a New Leaf Precharge Plea
Negotiations as a CriticalStagefor the Purposeof the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 59 B.C.
L. REv. E. SupP. 188, 199 (2018) ("plea negotiation process is adversarial").
[S]o soon as a party is charged with a crime and bound to answer, or committed for it,
that it becomes then, a public prosecution, and that the indictment is but a continuation
of it; and that from that stage of it he is entitled to compulsory process for his witnesses.
Allen, 10 Ga. at 91.
36 See Turner v. United States, 885 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming precedent). But
see Steven J. Mulroy, The Bright Line's Dark Side: Pre-ChargeAttachment ofthe Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, 92 WASH. L. REv. 213, 241-42 (2017) (disregarding bright-line rule for broader,
more workable rule). Mulroy proposed that the right attaches whenever a "prosecutor is involved
in substantive communications with a defendant" including "pre-charge plea and other
negotiations; subpoenaed grand jury testimony; pretrial depositions; .. . and similar situations." Id.
at 213.
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stages of prosecution, they are still subject to the attachment rule.3 7 The court
rejected attempts to soften the line between the "critical stage question" and
the "attachment question" concluding that these inquiries must be kept
distinct.38 These separate questions, while both important in determining
whether an accused is entitled to counsel, are the reason that some postindictment proceedings deserve protection and that same proceeding,
occurring pre-indictment, is not entitled to protection.39
The court held steadfast in their application that the Sixth
Amendment "attaches only at or after... adversary judicial proceedings

37 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 953 (differentiating facts in Turner from those in Frye and Lafler).
A defendant has no constitutional right to a plea offer and no guarantee that a judge will accept a
plea offer. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909, 1916 (1992) ("[T]here is a choice between (1) a right (that may be bought and sold) to an
elaborate trial, and (2) an inalienable right to a more casual trial process."); see also Mulroy, supra
note 36, at 217-18 (highlighting commonality of facts giving rise to Turner). Instances in which
there is a simultaneous or preceding pre-indictment plea offer will become more common, making
it harder to justify not extending the right to counsel to those instances. Mulroy, supra note 36, at
217-18. Mandatory sentencing and sentencing guidelines are another evolving area of the law
which has and will continue to influence the importance and application of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Metzger, supra note 23, at 1658. Laws in these areas place a unique importance
on the charges presented by the prosecutor, and an unrepresented defendant in these pre-indictment
proceedings could be seriously disadvantaged. Id.at 1663-64. Similarly, a lawyer's assistance in
seeking a reduced sentence for cooperating with the government is equally important in the presentencing and post-sentencing phases. Id. at 1668. Recently in Maslonka v. Hoffner, the Sixth
Circuit faced a similar, yet distinct, issue also unimaginable prior to the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment. 900 F.3d 269, 278-79 (6th Cir. 2018). That is, "whether or not cooperation with
federal authorities is considered part of the critical stage of state plea negotiations where ... a state
plea offer hinges on that federal cooperation." Id
38 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 953 (rejecting argument that preindictment and postindictment plea
negotiation stages should be treated equally); Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 211-12 (explaining difference
between questions). "Once attachment occurs, the accused ... is entitled to the presence of
appointed counsel during any 'critical stage' of the postattachment proceedings ...." Rothgery,
554 U.S. at 212. Thus, even post attachment, there will still be instances in which counsel's
presence is not required at certain proceedings. Id.
'9 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (refusing to offer assistance of counsel
during pre-indictment lineup); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (declining
to impose per se rule regarding critical stage question); Turner, 885 F.3d at 953 (enumerating
pretrial "trial-like confrontations" that are just as perilous as post-indictment confrontation). "The
initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
See also Brandon K. Breslow, Signs of Life in the Supreme Court's UnchartedTerritory: Why the
Right to Effective Assistance of CounselShould Attach to Pre-IndictmentPleaBargaining,62 FED.
LAW. 34, 38-39 (2015) (proposing right to counsel should attach to all plea negotiations, pre or
post-indictment alike); James S. Montana & John A. Galotto, Right to Counsel: Courts Adhere to
Bright-Line Limits, 16 CRIM. JUST. 4, 12 (2001) (postulating right to counsel should attach at
critical pre-indictment stages, such as plea bargaining).
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have been initiated. ' The court refused to expand the scope of the right to
counsel as some lower courts and other circuits have suggested.4
There are a number of alternative rule formulations that would better
serve those accused in pre-indictment scenarios that are similar to the rule
formulations that give defendants protection in post-indictment
proceedings.4 2 Additionally, there are valid concerns that the current brightline rule lends itself to "prosecutorial manipulation."4 3 Prosecutors may be
tempted to delay issuing a formal indictment with the intent that the
unprotected, unadvised accused will quickly accept a plea deal.' To remedy
this, when determining a critical stage, the court should consider whether:
(1) the government made its intent to prosecute known "either formally or
through informal means, such as grand jury investigation, plea bargaining,
or pre-charge discussions with the suspect or with defense counsel," (2)
formal charges would have followed if discussions broke down between the
parties, and (3) "it is a temporal fortuity that the case falls outside the
traditional... critical stage." " In Turner, the prosecution intended to move
forward with formal charges as evidenced by the plea offer and the

4o See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984) (failing to broaden applicability of
Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Turner,885 F.3d at 953 (articulating when Sixth Amendment
protections initiate). The dubitably concurring Judge Bush suggested the question of attachment
turns on the definitions of "accused" and "criminal prosecution," as used in the text of the Sixth
Amendment, and embarked on a thorough historical analysis of the terms to determine their
meaning at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified. Turner, 885 F.3d at 956 (Bush, J.,
concurring). Attachment is triggered in two instances: "a formal charge from the prosecutor, either
in the form of an indictment or information; or ... an appearance before a judge, as in arraignment
or first appearance." Mulroy, supranote 36, at 215.
41 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 953-54 (denying existence of circuit split); but see Mulroy, supra
note 36, at 230-33 (indicating First, Third, and Seventh Circuits and some state courts proposed
bright-line rule alternatives).
42 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 983-84 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (insisting on "flexible, fact-specific
analysis" of criminal confrontations to determine Sixth Amendment applicability); Mulroy, supra
note 36, at 241-42 (suggesting alternative application of rule would fairly benefit accused); see
also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 690-91 (articulating current rule).
43 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 983 (Stranch, J., dissenting) ("[P]rosecutors can simply delay
indicting people to extract unfavorable and uncounseled plea agreements."); Mulroy, supra note
36, at 233 (noting but for prosecutor's delay in filing charges, defendants entitled to effective
assistance).
44 See Mulroy, supra note 36, at 247-48 (describing prosecutor's incentives in delaying
indictment); see also Metzger, supra note 23, at 1690 (recognizing demerits of current application
of right to counsel). "[T]he absence of counsel will give the government an unfair advantage or...
determine the outcome of the proceeding.... [T]he government may well commit itself to
prosecuting but delay filing a formal charge." Metzger, supra note 23, at 1690.
45 See Metzger, supra note 23, at 1690 (highlighting potential prosecutorial manipulation
proposed rule would protect against). This formulation of the rule would not harshly exclude preindictment situations, post-sentence cases, and situations where there was "inadvertent or deliberate
manipulation of the process in order to circumvent the defendant's right to appointed counsel." Id.
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associated expiration date.4 6 Suggesting the case may not go forward
because the grand jury had not indicted the accused-as was the case in
Turner-merelybecause the grand jury was not yet presented with the case

offers the defendant a warped sense of security, exemplifying why counsel
is necessary incomplicated proceedings such as these.4 7 There is blatant
prosecutorial manipulation present when these tactics are used to coerce an
accused into accepting a plea offer.4 8
Another proposed rule suggests the right to counsel pivots either on

the involvement of law enforcement or on the defendant's direct interaction
49
with prosecutors regarding substantive aspects of his or her case.
Undeniably, the plea offer was a substantive aspect of Turner's case; in fact,
it was his whole case.5° Additionally, the court presumes the right to counsel
applies where a "proceeding carries a risk of substantial potential
prejudice."5 1 Plea offers are a powerful tool of the justice system and their

46 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 952 (commenting AUSA planned to bring charges and offered plea
with pending expiration date).
47 See Scott, supra note 37, at 1909-10 (describing popularity of plea bargaining process).
48 See Metzger, supra note 23, at 1690 (highlighting courts can find either inadvertent or
deliberate prosecutorial manipulation).
49 See Mulroy, supra note 36, at 233-34 (suggesting another application of rule that Sixth
Law enforcement's
Amendment right attaches when defendant interacts with prosecutor).
interactions with suspects, are often just that-interactions-because law enforcement cannot
initiate proceedings in the same way a prosecutor can. Id. at 235-36. As such, a suspect is arguably
not yet an "accused" as the Sixth Amendment intended. Id. Furthermore, once a prosecutor
becomes involved, it is evident that the inquiry has turned from fact-finding police work to
adversarial, prosecutorial work. Id. at 231-32. This proposed rule is open-ended and, in
application, would extend to the following situations and more:
[N]egotiations on cooperating with the investigation in exchange for immunity;
negotiations on the surrender of a wanted person; negotiations on the turning over of
potentially incriminating evidence; and negotiations on the terms under which someone
will take the police to point out something (like the location of a body) ....
[C]ommunications concerning the grand jury testimony of the suspect, or depositions
....
taken in preparation for trial
Id.at 241; see also Metzger, supra note 23, at 1690-91 (describing how interactions with police
can present collateral consequences unknown to layperson). Metzger suggests defendants are
entitled to protection when confronted with "intricacies of the criminal procedure system that may
be 'mysterious, intricate and complex,"' such as interactions with pretrial service officers or
probation officers, in situations like a lineup, for example. Metzger, supranote 23, at 1690-91.
'0 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 955; Scott, supra note 37, at 1912 ("[Plea bargaining] is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.").
51 See Metzger, supra note 23, at 1691 (suggesting right to counsel should attach when effects
of proceeding are irrevocable).
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use should still be encouraged but in a manner the Constitution envisioned,
52
which is what these proposed rules seek to achieve.
A workable solution would allow the attachment question and is the
critical stage question to be asked in an interchangeable order.53 As it
operates now, the question of whether an aspect of the prosecution is a
critical stage follows, somewhat naturally, after the determination that the
Sixth Amendment attached to the prosecution.5 4 But, this order advanced
the improper notion that a defendant would not face a critical stage of the
prosecution prior to traditional attachment. If courts instead adopt the idea
that there may be instances when a critical stage can occur before a "formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,"
defendants will be given a chance at a just and equitable proceeding. 6 This
allows the law to evolve as the courts consider new questions and issues that
were unimaginable when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, or even when
the controlling precedent was decided nearly forty years ago.57 Ultimately,

52 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 965 (Bush, J.,
concurring) (summarizing what constitutional framers
intended by enacting Sixth Amendment); see also United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175, 1182
(6th Cir. 1980) ("It should be emphasized again that this is not a major or even a particularly
significant extension of Sixth Amendment protection, because in most cases formal proceedings
would have begun before plea bargaining commences.").
53 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 968 (Clay, J., concurring) (suggesting critical stage question is just
as important as attachment question). This idea is presumptively foreclosed by Gouveia, but the
Court never considered the question of whether the right attaches in pre-indictment plea
negotiations. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-92 (1984); see Kennedy v. United
States, 756 F.3d 492, 493 (6th Cir. 2014) (admitting issue would be one of first impression for
Supreme Court). In Turner, the dissent advocates that the court ought to "scrutinize [the] formal
federal plea offer to determine whether it marked the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings."
885 F.3d at 980 (Stranch, J., dissenting). In other words, the court should consider whether the
critical plea offer stage triggered the attachment of the right to counsel. Id.
54 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 956-63 (Bush, J., concurring) (embarking on thorough historical
analysis of terms "accused" and "criminal prosecution").
55 See id. at 981 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (suggesting pre-indictment plea negotiations contain
underpinnings of adversarial judicial proceedings). "But while criticality and attachment are
distinct concepts, there is overlap between the factors used to analyze them, such as adversity." Id.
(citation omitted).
56 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (suggesting Sixth Amendment is invoked
when adversarial positions solidify and defendant finds he needs counsel); see also Metzger, supra
note 23, at 1689 (suggesting softened approach to critical stage question). A court could find a
critical stage by evaluating the following procedural stages identified by the Supreme Court: "(1)
adversariness-in-fact between the individual and the prosecution ('adversariness-in-fact'); (2)
complexity in the procedural stage in question ('complexity'); and (3) potential prejudice to the
individual, which prejudice can be countered by providing counsel ('prejudice/benefit')." Metzger,
supranote 23, at 1689.
57 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 965 (Bush, J., concurring) (reminding that Supreme Court routinely
applies founding-era precepts to then-unknowable modem-day scenarios); Mulroy, supra note 36,
at 217-18 (exemplifying how changed rule benefits accused via new procedural methods). In his
concurrence, Judge Bush also noted that the framers had "no understanding of modem-day charge
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the dissent as well as many of the concurring judges, who begrudgingly
agreed with the majority because they felt as though they must follow the
Supreme Court precedent, call for a case-by-case, practical evaluation of the
facts and circumstances to properly determine when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches.5 8
In Turner v. United States, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to a plea negotiation
that occurred prior to an indictment. The court blindly applied what it
believed to be the relevant Supreme Court precedent in finding that, because
the plea negotiation took place before a "formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment," the right to counsel did not attach
to the proceedings. This outcome left the defendant, who deserved counsel
at that critical stage of his criminal proceedings, at a disadvantage that
violates what the Sixth Amendment broadly sought to protect. There are
many viable options to resolve this issue that would better serve the interests
of both prosecutors and defendants. Courts should reevaluate the manner in
which a defendant's right to counsel at the pre-indictment stage is
determined and rework the existing framework to best serve the criminal
justice system as a whole.
SierraLovely

bargaining," suggesting another method of entering verdicts in the current criminal justice system
that was unimaginable when the Amendment was passed. Turner, 885 F.3d at 965 (Bush, J.,
concurring). In Moody, the court highlighted the changing system saying, "[t]he Sixth Amendment
right to counsel historically has evolved to meet the challenges presented by a changing legal
paradigm. The criminal justice system has and is changing so that defendants now face critical
stages of their prosecutions prior to indictment." 206 F.3d at 618 (Wiseman, J., concurring).
Examples include cases involving mandatory sentencing, sentencing guidelines, and joint federalstate task forces. Metzger, supra note 23, at 1636; Mulroy, supranote 36, at 217-18.
58 See Turner, 885 F.3d at 979-80 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (dulling attachment doctrine from
harsh, bright-line rule used by majority); see also United States v. Olson, No. 2:12-cr-00327-APG,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129320, at *11 (D.Nev. Aug. 1, 2019) (granting appeal as to whether right
to effective counsel attaches to pre-indictment formal plea offer). In light of Turner and the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, the court found "that reasonable jurists could debate whether
a person can be denied effective counsel during a pre-indictment plea negotiation." Olsen, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129320, at *11.

